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Abstract—The use of autonomous vehicles in real-world ap-
plications is often precluded by the difficulty of providing
safety guarantees for their complex controllers. The simulation-
based testing of these controllers cannot deliver sufficient safety
guarantees, and the use of formal verification is very challenging
due to the hybrid nature of the autonomous vehicles. Our work-
in-progress paper introduces a formal verification approach that
addresses this challenge by integrating the numerical computa-
tion of such a system (in GNU/Octave) with its hybrid system
verification by means of a proof assistant (Isabelle). To show
the effectiveness of our approach, we use it to verify differential
invariants of an Autonomous Marine Vehicle with a controller
switching between multiple modes.
Index Terms—theorem proving, dynamical systems, au-
tonomous vehicles, control systems, assurance cases
I. INTRODUCTION
Engineering controllers for autonomous vehicles requires a
range of models, e.g. of the dynamics and of the control algo-
rithms, for validating and verifying their key properties [1], [2].
Numerical computation (NC, e.g. with MATLAB) is a widely
used simulation technique for model validation (i.e. closing
the reality gap) and controller testing. However, simulation is,
like testing, mostly limited to the demonstration of defects,
since it can only consider a small fraction of the input space.
For correctness, particularly to assess safety, full coverage
of this space is desirable or mandatory. For hybrid systems,
full coverage can be achieved only using symbolic reasoning
techniques, such as deductive verification [3], due to the
uncountable state space. We therefore need the translation of
a validated model into a form amenable to verification in a
proof environment such as Isabelle/HOL [4].
In this work, we investigate this translation for the case of a
hybrid model of an Autonomous Marine Vehicle (AMV) and
the formal verification of its safety properties. We describe the
dynamics of the vehicle’s motion, and controllers for waypoint
approach and obstacle avoidance. We model the controller
using hybrid state charts, including the mode switching for
mitigating accidents between the operator and the safety con-
troller. We simulate our model in the NC tool GNU/Octave,1
for the purpose of validation against real-world trials, and
translate this into an implementation of differential Dynamic
Logic [3], [5] (dL) in Isabelle/HOL for deductive verification.
1GNU/Octave. http://octave.sourceforge.io/
To support this, we extend it to support matrices, discrete state,
and a form of modular verification.
Our preliminary work serves as a template for how a
translation from an NC tool to Isabelle can be achieved, and
provides additional evidence that Isabelle provides a credible
and flexible solution for hybrid systems verification. Our
work is inspired by Mitsch et al. [6] who provide a generic
verified model for collision avoidance in KeYmaera X [7]. We
advance their work through provision of explicit support for
transcendental functions in the system dynamics, a higher-level
notation in our tool that bridges the semantic gap with control
engineers, and access to Isabelle’s automated proof facilities.
After an overview of the technologies we use in Section II,
we present our approach to validation-based formal verifica-
tion in Section III and close with a discussion in Section IV.
II. BACKGROUND
Isabelle/HOL [4] is a proof assistant for Higher Order Logic
(HOL). It includes a functional specification language and
an array of proof facilities, including sledgehammer [8],
which integrates automated provers, such as Z3. Isabelle is
highly extensible, and has a variety of mathematical libraries,
notably for Multivariate Analysis [9] and Ordinary Differential
Equations [10], [11] (ODEs), which provide the foundations
for verification of hybrid systems.
Isabelle/UTP [12] is a semantic framework based on Hoare
and He’s Unifying Theories of Programming (UTP) [13], built
on Isabelle/HOL. It supports diverse semantic models in a
variety of paradigms, such as reactive, concurrent, and hybrid
systems, and their application to verification. For example,
it contains a tactic, hoare-auto, that automates verification
of sequential programs using Hoare logic that by utilising
sledgehammer to discharge verification conditions.
dL is a logic for deductive verification of hybrid systems,
which is supported by the KeYmaera X tool [7]. dL includes
a hybrid program modelling language, and a verification
calculus based on dynamic logic. It can be used to prove
invariants both of control algorithms and continuous dynam-
ics, which makes it ideal for verifying hybrid systems. It
avoids the need for explicit solutions to differential equations,
by using a technique called differential induction. Recently,
differential induction has been embedded into Isabelle [14]
and Isabelle/UTP [5] to create differential Hoare logic (dH),
which also supports verification of hybrid programs, but in
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Figure 1: An AMV in real and a model of its physics
a more general setting. In this paper, we integrate dH into
Isabelle/UTP, and extend it.
III. APPROACH
Our case study, the C-Worker 52 (Figure 1a) is an AMV
designed to support hydrographic survey work. It operates in
the open sea and so must avoid collisions with both static and
dynamic obstacles, such as rocky outcrops and other vessels.
We consider a safety controller that (1) avoids collisions with
obstacles where possible by taking evasive maneuvers; and
(2) mitigates the effects where avoidance is impossible. Our
industrial partner, D-RisQ3, is developing a safety controller
called the Last Response Engine (LRE) [15] implementing the
above functionality when the boat is operating autonomously.
For verification, we focus on avoidance of static obstacles.
A. Modelling the Dynamics and the Controller
Modelling the AMV Dynamics: The dynamical model
should be close enough to reality to do NC and abstract
enough to reduce the complexity of formal verification to a
level appropriate for a credible assurance case [16].
Indicated in Figure 1b, at time t ∈ T , we consider the
velocity vA = [vxA, v
y
A]
T and position pA of the AMV, the
position pW of a next waypoint to be approached, and a set
O of obstacles, each described by its velocity vOi and position
pOi . p and v are vectors in planar coordinates (x, y) over R2.
These parameters form a state space X with tuples
x = [pA,vA,pO,vO]
T .
Below, we abbreviate pE by E where E ∈ {A,O,W}.
We also consider parameters calculated from x, such as the
distance to the next waypoint
∥∥AW∥∥ or the angle φAO
between the AMV velocity vector and the distance vector AO.
For sake of simplicity, we consider the AMV as a particle
with mass m and formulate its dynamics as the following
system of ordinary differential equations
p˙A = v, v˙A = f/m, v˙O = 0, and p˙O = 0 (1)
where f/m implements Newton’s second law of the kinetics
of particle masses relating a force applied to the vehicle and
this vehicle’s acceleration at time t. To remain in scope of our
investigation, we further simplify the AMV dynamics, omit-
ting disturbances (e.g. crosswind) and perturbations (e.g. flow
resistance), and restricting our analysis to static obstacles.
2C-Worker 5. https://www.asvglobal.com/product/c-worker-5/
3D-RisQ Software Systems. http://www.drisq.com/
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Figure 2: Block structure diagram of the dynamical model and
the two-layered controller with the corresponding monitors
Modelling the AMV Controller: Figure 2 shows the struc-
ture of the plant consisting of the dynamical model of the
AMV and its environment (as explained before) and a two-
layered controller comprising the autopilot (AP) and the LRE.
The discrete low-level control of the vehicle is facilitated
by the AP through generating the propulsive force f of the
AMV as an input to the AMV dynamics. Within the frame
of reference of the trajectory of the AMV, we model the
AMV’s single thruster by calculating two components of f ,
the longitudinal (or tangential) acceleration force fl collinear
with the AMV’s velocity v and the radial acceleration force
ft perpendicular to fl, such that
f = fl + ft = fl
[
cos(φA)
sin(φA)
]
+ ft
[ −sgn(φA) sin(φA)
sgn(φA) cos(φA)
]
.
The discrete high-level control of the AMV is partially
facilitated by the LRE through switching between several
operating modes: an Operator Control Mode (MOM), a Main
Operating Mode (MOM), a High Caution Mode (HCM), and
a Collision Avoidance Mode (CAM). When in OCM, the
operator has responsibility for the AMV. When in MOM,
the AMV navigates towards the next waypoint at maximum
speed. If it gets close to, but not on collision course with,
an obstacle then it switches to HCM. If a potential future
collision is detected, it transitions to CAM to make evasive
maneuvers. Each of these modes provides the AP with a
particular setpoint w = [rs,pW ]T (i.e. target speed and
location of next waypoint) for the calculation of f by the
AP as described by the hybrid automaton in Figure 3
fl = k
l
p · |rs − ‖vA‖ | (2)
ft =
{
ktp · φAW , in MOM
ktp · sgn(φAW ) · fmax, in CAM/HCM (3)
In this example, we use a simple proportional controller for
f with directional proportionality factors kp as shown in
Equations (2) and (2). For obstacle avoidance manoeuvres,
we calculate the safe braking distance by
dsb =
sb · ‖vA‖2 ·m
−2 · kbp · fmax
(4)
with a safety margin sb to capture modelling uncertainty and
define the near-Obstacle (nO) and on-Collision-Course (oCC)
hazards as the predicates
nO ≡ ∥∥AO∥∥ > dsb and oCC ≡ nO ∧ |φAO| < φ. (5)
In MOM, we add a hysteresis h to φ in order to delay ma-
noeuvre cancellation. Figure 3 describes the overall behaviour
MOM
entry / vˆA = vnorm
entry / pW = ∗
fl = k
l
p · |vˆA − ‖vA‖ |
ft = ktp · ϕAW
start
OCM
entry / vˆA = ∗
entry / pW = ∗
fl = ∗
ft = ∗
HCM
entry / vˆA = vsaf
entry / pW = ∗
fl = k
l
p · |vˆA − ‖vA‖ |
ft = ktp · ϕAW
CAM
entry / vˆA = vsaf
entry / pW = ∗
fl = k
l
p · |vˆA − ‖vA‖ |
ft = ktp · sgn(ϕAW ) · fmax
req
¬req
nO ¬nO nO
oCC
¬oCC
Figure 3: Behaviour of the LRE and AP as a Moore machine
∗. . . non-deterministic assignment by the operator
of how the LRE switches between the four modes to provide
w to the AP. From the components LRE and AP shown in
Figure 2 and from the modes shown in Figure 3, one can then
derive the interfaces for the detailed software design of the
AMV control system.
Note on Abstraction: The transition from the discrete LRE
and AP to the continuous AMV physics is accomplished
by a conversion of (D)iscretely timed f inputs in form
of (C)ontinuous, piece-wise constant signals, processed by
actuators. Vice versa, the digital controller (particularly, the
Aggregator in Figure 2) samples the environment through
sensors at a certain rate. Figure 2 indicates this abstraction
by D/C and C/D converters. Although we chose to apply this
abstraction to the generation of f , in practice, this will happen
inside the thrusters where, e.g. digital signals control a servo
motor of a combustion engine and a rudder to generate f .
Simulating the Model: We implemented the AMV model in
a simple integrator-based simulator in plain GNU/Octave. For
that, we derived parameters, such as weight, maximum speed
and propulsive force, from the C-Worker 5 specification. Addi-
tionally, we identified controller constants, such as klp, during
simulation. Figure 4 shows a trajectory of the AMV (green dot)
turning around to make its way to the next waypoint W (blue
dot) while circumventing a floating obstacle (pink dot). The
initial state x0 ∈ X is set to
x0 = [−.5,−3.8︸ ︷︷ ︸
vA[m/s]
,−10,−10︸ ︷︷ ︸
pA[m]
, 0, 0︸︷︷︸
vO1 [m/s]
,−12,−18︸ ︷︷ ︸
pO1 [m]
, . . . ]T
and the simulation run for the constants rs = 4m/s, pW =
[0, 0]T , and the time interval T = [0, 35] sec. Note, the 2D
trajectory from the AMV exhibits a deviation from its course
where oCC turned true. The lower middle graph shows this
as the event of dsb ≈ 13 > |AO| where the magenta curve
touches the red curve at t ≈ 5s, simultaneous to the reduction
of ‖vA‖ after the switch to CAM (cf. top right graph).
Beyond Simulation: Our quest for covering the input
space (Section I) requires us to ask how we can know that from
wherever in X we start, wherever an obstacle is, in whatever
interval T we evaluate a trajectory, will the AMV always
steer away from an obstacle in CAM, will it always reduce
speed in HCM, will it reach the next waypoint within a given
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Figure 4: Simulation: the AMV (green dot) approaching next
waypoint (blue dot) while crossing an obstacle (pink dot)
time in MOM? Such questions require a more fundamental
investigation of the model discussed in the next section.
B. Verification
In order to support deductive verification of AMVs, we
apply Isabelle/UTP to prove properties of the controller and
system dynamics. For this, we utilise Isabelle/dH which
integrates dH [14], [5] into Isabelle/UTP. We extend it with
matrices, discrete variables, and modular reasoning. Along
with standard Hoare logic laws, Isabelle/dH includes the key
rules from dL, including differential induction and cut, which
are at the core of our verification approach. We prove these
laws as theorems of Hoare logic in Isabelle/UTP4.
Theorem III.1. Differential Induction and Cut
differentiable(P ) ∧ (B ⇒ LF (P ))
{P} 〈x˙ = F (x) | B(x)〉 {P} (6)
{P} 〈F | B〉 {P} {Q} 〈F | B ∧ P 〉 {Q}
{P ∧ Q} 〈F | B〉 {Q} (7)
Here, 〈x˙ = F (x) | B(x)〉 is a system of ODEs with an
evolution domain B. The dynamical system is permitted to
evolve provided that the ODEs in F , and predicate B, are
satisfied for all points on the solution trajectory. (6) states that
if P is everywhere differentiable, and its differentiated form
follows from B, then P is an invariant. (7) shows that if we
can prove that P is invariant, then we can use it as an axiom
of the dynamics to prove that Q is also an invariant [3].
We extend [5] with support for automation of Lie deriva-
tives [17] evaluation. The ODEs are encoded as a vector
field F : Rn → Rn. LF (P ) denotes the Lie derivative
of the predicate P along F . P is restricted to the form
e R f , for R ∈ {=,≤, <}, over differentiable expressions
4We omit the proofs for reasons of space. They can be found in our repos-
itory (https://github.com/isabelle-utp/utp-main) and accompanying links.
e, f : Rn → R, and their conjunctions and disjunctions, such
as 2x ≤ 5. We exemplify L below.
LF (e ≤ f) = (LF (e) ≤ LF (f)) (8)
LF (e+ f) = LF (e) + LF (f) (9)
LF (e · f) = LF (e) · f + e · LF (f) (10)
LF (sin(e)) = LF (e) · cos(e) (11)
LF (x) = (λs : Rn.getx F (s)) (12)
These are largely standard, such as the product rule (10). Of
note, (12) shows the treatment of a continuous variable x : R.
We encode mutable variables using lenses [18], which are pairs
(x : V =⇒ S) , (getx : S → V,putx : S → V → S)
for some suitable state space S and variable type V , that
obey intuitive algebraic laws [12]. Here, we require that every
continuous variable has a bounded linear get function, which
is satisfied, for example, when x is a projection of a Euclidean
space. The derivative of x is an expression that applies the get
function to the derivative of the state (F (s)). This can be seen
as a semantic substitution of x by its derivative [12].
Invariants can contain transcendental functions such as
sin and log. We also support equalities between arbitrary
Euclidean spaces, such as matrices. To close the gap between
Octave and Isabelle, we have implemented a smart matrix
parser. A matrix in Isabelle is represented by a function:
A mat[M,N ] , N → M → A, where N and M are finite
types denoting the dimensions, and A is the element type,
usually R. Thus, the Isabelle type system can be used to ensure
that matrix expressions are well-formed. We use the syntax[
[x11, x
1
2, · · ·x1n], · · · , [xm1 , xm2 , · · · , xmn ]
]
to represent a m by n matrix in Isabelle, which is a list of
lists. Our parser can infer the dimensions of a well-formed
matrix, and produce suitable dimension types, which aids
proof. Moreover, we have proved theorems that allow symbolic
evaluation of certain vector operations, for example:
[x1, y1] + [x2, y2] = [x1 + x2, y1 + y2]
n · [x, y] = [n · x, n · y]
We also define the matrix lens
mat-lens(m : M,n : N) : A =⇒ A mat[M,N ]
which accesses an element. With it, we can model both
variables that refer to an entire matrix and also its elements.
We have developed a tactic in Isabelle/dH called dInduct,
which automates the application of Theorem III.1 by deter-
mining whether P is indeed differentiable everywhere, and
if so applying differentiation and substitution. The resulting
predicate can be discharged, or refuted, using Isabelle’s tactics.
Hybrid systems in Isabelle/dH follow the pattern of Sys ,
(Ctrl ; Dyn)?, where the controller and dynamics iteratively
take turns in updating the variables [6]. Proving a safety
property P of Sys entails finding an invariant I both of Ctrl
and Dyn, such that I ⇒ P . Isabelle/dH splits the state space
of a hybrid system into its continuous and discrete variables.
Continuous variables change during evolution, but discrete
variables are constant and updated only by assignments.
The continuous state space (ΣC) must form a Euclidean
space, and so is typically composed of reals, vectors, and
matrices. There are no restrictions on the discrete state space,
and it may use any Isabelle data type.
Case Study: We describe each of the continuous variables
using lenses, e.g. p,v : R mat[1, 2] =⇒ ΣC5. In addition to
those mentioned in §III-A, we also include a : R mat[1, 2] for
the acceleration, and s : R, for the linear speed. Technically, s
can be derived as ‖v‖, but its inclusion makes proving invari-
ants easier. Most are monitored variables of the environment,
except a, which is updated by the AP. The discrete variables
include waypoint location (wp : R2); obstacle set (ob :
P(R2)); linear speed and heading set points (rs, rh : R); force
vector (f : R2); and mode (m : {OCM,MOM,HCM,CAM}).
Next, we describe the dynamics.
Definition III.2 (AMV Dynamics).
dynAV ,

t˙ = 1; p˙ = v; v˙ = a; a˙ = 0;
s˙ =
v · a
s
2 s 6= 03 ‖a‖ ;
φ˙ = acos
(
(v + a) · v
‖v + a‖ · ‖v‖
)2 s 6= 03 0

axAV ,
(
0 ≤ s ∧ s ≤ S ∧ s ·
[
sin(φ)
cos(φ)
]
= v ∧ t < 
)
Dyn , t := 0 ; 〈dynAV | axAV 〉
Dynamics dynAV is a system of six ODEs. For the linear
speed derivative, we consider the special case when s = 0,
where the speed derivative is derived from a, and the rota-
tional speed is 0. We also axiomatise some properties of the
dynamics in axAV : (1) the linear speed must be in [0, S]; (2)
v must be the same as s multiplied by the orientation unit
vector; (3) time must not advance beyond , which puts an
upper bound on the time between control decisions.
Next, we model the LRE, which is encoded as a set of
guarded commands derived from Figure 3. In each iteration,
the LRE updates state variables and can transition to a different
state. Whilst in MOM, the speed set point is the maximum
speed (S), and the LRE invokes the command steerToWP that
updates the heading towards the current way point.
Definition III.3 (Simplified LRE). LRE ,
m = MOM→

rs := S ; steerToWP ;
if oCC then m := CAM fi ;
if ∃o ∈ ob. ‖o− p‖ ≤ D
then m := HCM ; rs := H fi

m = HCM→
 rs := H ; steerToWP ;if ∀o ∈ ob. ‖o− p‖ > D
then m := MOM fi

m = OCM→ skip
m = CAM→ · · ·

5We omit the A subscripts for brevity.
Figure 5: Autopilot in Isabelle/UTP
If oCC is detected the LRE transitions to CAM. If nO holds
but not oCC, then the LRE switches to HCM. From HCM, the
speed set point is decreased to H . Once the AMV is no longer
close to an obstacle, the LRE may return to MOM. OCM
exhibits no behaviour since the operator provides the control
inputs. Finally, CAM is where collision avoidance procedures
are executed. Its behaviour is left unspecified for now. The
final component we model is the autopilot.
Definition III.4 (Autopilot Controller). AP ,
if ‖rs− s‖ > s
then ft := sgn(rs− s) ·min
(
kpgv · ‖rs− s‖ ,
fmax
)
else ft := 0 fi ;
if ‖rh− φ‖ > φ
then fl := sgn(rh− φ) ·min
(
kpgr · ‖rh− φ‖ ,
fmax
)
else fl := 0 fi ;
f := fl ·
[
cos(φ)
sin(φ)
]
+ ft ·
[
sin(φ)
cos(φ)
]
; a := f/m
The AP takes rs and rh as inputs, computes f , and calcu-
lates a. The constants s and φ limit the controller activity
when the speed is close to the set point. Its representation
in Isabelle/UTP is shown in Figure 5. Continuous variables
are distinguished using the namespace c, e.g. c:x. Scalar
multiplication and division are distinguished operators, n∗Rx
and n /R x. Finally, we describe the overall AMV behaviour.
Definition III.5. AMV , (LRE ; AP ; Dyn)?
The LRE executes first to determine the new speed set points.
Following this, the autopilot calculates the new acceleration
vector. Finally, the dynamical system evolves the continuous
variables for up to  seconds, and then the cycle begins again.
We will now proceed to verify some properties of the system
using Isabelle/dH. We begin with some structural properties.
Theorem III.6 (Structural Properties).
• LRE nmods {t,p,v,a, s, φ}
• AP nmods {t,p,v, s, φ}
• Dyn nmods {wp, ob, rs, rh, ft, f l,f ,m}
P nmods A means that P does not modify the variables in A.
It enables modular verification using the following theorem:
S nmods x =⇒ {p(x)}S {p(x)}
If x is not modified by S, then any predicate in x is invariant.
We can verify that the LRE does not modify any of the
Figure 6: Example proof in Isabelle/dH
continuous variables, as it only updates the (discrete) set
points. The AP modifies only the continuous variable a. We
can prove that axAV is an invariant of both LRE and AP , and
therefore of the entire system. The dynamics can potentially
change any of the continuous variables, but does not change
any of the discrete variables. These structural properties are
automatically proved, and are useful to ensure structural well-
formedness of a controller under development.
We next prove some invariants of the system using dH.
Theorem III.7 (Collinearity of v and a).
{a · v = ‖a‖ · ‖v‖}Dyn {a · v = ‖a‖ · ‖v‖}
Proof. We first prove that a·v ≥ 0 and (a·v)2 = (a·a)·(v·v)
are both invariants by theorem III.1. We can then show these
are equivalent with a · v = ‖a‖ · ‖v‖.
Collinearity means that v and a have the same direction and
the AMV is travelling straight. A corollary is below.{
a · v = ‖a‖·‖v‖
}
Dyn
{
p =
t2
2
· a+ t · old(v) + old(p)
}
This states that if the AMV is travelling in a straight line,
then its position can be obtained through integration of p˙. By
Theorem III.6, collinearity is also trivially an invariant of the
LRE, since it does not modify any continuous variables.
We show proof of a further corollary in Figure 6 in
Isabelle/UTP: if the AMV is moving straight, then the heading
is constant. We introduce a ghost variable X for the current
heading φ. The proof proceeds by performing a differential
cut (dCut split’), which allows us to assume collinearity in
the dynamical system. Theorem III.7 corresponds to the fact
collinear vector accel in Isabelle. Then, we use differential
induction via the dInduct auto tactic, which also applies
algebraic simplification laws. Finally, we call sledgehammer
which provides SMT proofs to discharge the remaining proof
obligation, which is essentially a·v = ‖a‖·‖v‖ ⇒ φ˙ = 0. This
technique allows us to harness all the mathematical results
proved in HOL and HOL-Analysis in our proofs [9], [10].
Collinearity is established by AP when the heading set
point is the same as the actual heading:
Theorem III.8 (Autopilot Collinearity).
0 ≤ s ∧ s ≤ rs
∧ ‖rh− φ‖ < φ
∧ v = s ·
[
sin(φ)
cos(φ)
]
AP
a · v = ‖a‖ · ‖v‖

Proof. Hoare logic reasoning and vector arithmetic. A crucial
fact is that [sin(φ), cos(φ)] · [sin(φ), cos(φ)] = 1.
The theorem shows that if the linear speed is between 0 and
rs, φ and rh are sufficiently close, and v can be derived from
the linear speed and heading, then afterwards a and v are
again collinear. Now, by the sequential composition law, we
can compose this with III.7 to obtain the same Hoare triple
for AP ; Dyn. Finally, we show a property of the LRE. m = MOM ∧‖ang(wp− p)− φ‖ ≤ φ∧ (∃o ∈ ob. ‖p− o‖ ≤ D)
LRE
 m = HCM∧ rs = H ∧‖rh− φ‖ ≤ φ

This shows that if the LRE is in MOM, and the heading is
currently towards the waypoint, but an obstacle is close, then
it will transition to HCM, drop the set point speed to H and
the requested heading remains close to the actual heading.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have made preliminary steps to integrating
NC with theorem proving in Isabelle. Octave and Isabelle’s
approaches to mathematics are, in many ways, quite different.
Octave is focused on efficient NC, whereas Isabelle is based
on foundational mathematics and proof. Nevertheless, our in-
vestigation indicates that they can effectively be used together.
Most of the required Octave functions, such as, sin, sgn,
and the vector operations are present in Isabelle, and are
accompanied by a large body of theorems [9], [10], [11]. The
Archive of Formal Proofs6 (AFP) has several useful libraries;
for example, we used Manuel Eberl’s library for calculating
angles [19]. Combining libraries with the flexible syntax of
Isabelle, the program notation of Isabelle/UTP, and our matrix
syntax, we can achieve a fairly direct translation of Octave
functions, as Figure 5 illustrates. Verification can be automated
by the hoare-auto tactic, though this dependends on arithmetic
lemma libraries, some of which we needed to prove manually
for the verification. Nevertheless, in our experience, sledge-
hammer [8] performs quite well with arithmetic problems.
Moreover, Isabelle has the approximation tactic, which can
prove real and transcendental inequalities [20].
For the dynamics, it is necessary to produce an explicit
system of first order ODEs, as shown in Definition III.2.
Consequently, any algebraic equations must be converted. For
example, we could not include the value of φ, but needed to
give its derivative and include an axiom linking this with s and
v. The challenge is finding invariants, and having sufficient
background lemmas to prove the verification conditions.
There have been previous works on integrating NC with
deductive verification. Notably, Zhan et al. [21] have used Hy-
brid CSP and an accompanying Hoare logic to verify Simulink
block diagrams in Isabelle. Our work is more modest, in
that we focus on sequential hybrid programs, but with a
transparent translation and a high degree of automation. The
dominant and most automated tool for hybrid systems deduc-
tive verification remains KeYmaera X [7], [6]. Nevertheless,
we believe that our preliminary results show the advantages of
targeting Isabelle. Firstly, this allows integration of a variety of
6Archive of Formal Proofs. https://www.isa-afp.org/.
mathematical libraries to support reasoning. Secondly, we can
combine notations with ODEs, and in the future aim to support
refinement to code using libraries like Isabelle/C [22]. Thirdly,
as illustrated by the obstacle register, with Isabelle/HOL we
have the potential to extend dL with additional features like
collections as used in quantified dL [23].
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